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POWERS IN TRUST AND THE TERMINATION OF
POWERS BY THE DONEE 1
LEWIS M. SImES
In its broader meaning a power may be described as the capac-
ity to change legal relations.2 In this sense the law of powers
is well nigh infinite in extent. The term is here employed in a
more limited way, as it has been used in the law of Future In-
terests. For the purpose of this paper a power is the ability
possessed by any person to extinguish legal relations in property,
real or personal, and to create new legal relations therein, such
power existing without regard to whether he has or has not
other legal relations in the property concerned. Examples of
such powers, which are commonly involved in the American deci-
sions, are: the power of an executor to sell land as provided in
the will; the power to appoint property, either to members of
a class or without restriction; and the power given to a life
tenant to sell for maintenance. Some types of powers will neces-
sarily be excluded from this discussion, though within the defi-
nition stated, because the courts have not dealt with them in
the same manner as the powers under consideration. Among
these are the power of an agent to dispose of property, and
powers created by statute, such as the powers of an assignee in
bankruptcy, or of a sheriff, administrator or other officer, to
dispose of property as provided by law.
The primary purpose of this paper is to propose the following
as a statement of the American law: All powers are termninable
by act of the donee except powers in trslt. In view of the fact
that the character of so-called powers in trust is a matter of
some uncertainty, this discussion will consist of two parts. The
first will consider the question: What is a power in trust?; the
second: To what extent are powers terminable by act of the
donee?
I. POWERS IN TRUST
An examination of cases, both English and American, dis-
closes a frequent use of the terms "power in trust," "power
in the nature of a trust," or "power coupled with a trust," in
such vague and uncertain fashion as to leave the reader hope-
lessly at sea. It is believed, however, that the courts do recog-
'The -writer desires to acknowledge the helpful suggestions he has received
from Professors W. R. Vance and A. L. Corbin, of the Yale Law School,
in the preparation of this paper.
2 See HonraL, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 50-GO; Corbin,
Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 YA.= LAw JouRNAAu. 163.
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nize, with a fair degree of consistency, a definite concept which
is termed a power in trust.
Before plunging into an analysis of the nature of a power in
trust, it may be well, by way of illustration, to refer to a decision
in which the character of this concept is directly involved. The
West Virginia case of Milhollen's Adm'?r v. Rice 1 presents the
common situation of a power to appoint to a class, where the
donee died without making any appointment. A testator had
left one half his real estate (in which he gave his wife a life
interest) to be sold at her death, and had provided that the
proceeds were to be disposed of "to whom she thinks proper
of her heirs." The wife died without executing the power. In
a bill by the administrator de bonis non to obtain a construction
of the will it was held that the power of disposal conferred on
the wife was a power in the nature of a trust; and that, there-
fore, the half interest in the proceeds of the land should go to
her heirs to be equally distributed if more than one. Had not
the power been given in trust, there would have been an intes-
tacy on the death of the donee without exercising it. The dis-
cussion of the court is instructive. Three requisites were named
as essential to the creation of a power in trust: first, there must
be a certainty in the subject; second, there must be a certainty
in the object; and, third, the power must be imperative. The
court then explained the meaning of the term "imperative" in
this connection, as follows:
"Its meaning as here used is that under the will it is his duty
to exercise the power; and it is to be borne in mind that it is
always his duty to carry out the intent of the testator, as shown
by the will, no matter in what language that intent may have
been expressed; and, if, therefore, the testator, either by express
declaration, or fair implication, shows that he wishes the power
he has given to be executed, it becomes the duty of the donee
to execute such power; and such power is then regarded as im-
perative in the sense in which I have used the word."
This decision suggests the writer's mode of approach to the
question: What is a power in trust? In this paper the subject
will be discussed in the following order. First, we shall con-
sider briefly what are the distinguishing marks of a power in
trust. Second, having determined the marks by which a power
in trust may be recognized, we shall endeavor to determine what
legal consequences result from the existence of such a power,-
in other words, if we say with the West Virginia court that a
power in trust is imperative, we shall then ask, does it make
any difference whether it is or is not imperative. Most of the
discussion will be directed to the question: What are the legal
813 W. Va. 510 (1878).
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consequences of the donee's failure to exercise a power in trust?
For Part II of this paper is reserved the question: Does a power
in trust differ from other powers with respect to the donee's
ability to extinguish it?
The first question is not in doubt. Whatever may be the legal
consequences involved, the distinguishing mark of a power in
trust is that the donor intended it to be imperative. That is
to say, the person who created the power intended that it should
be exercised; he contemplated imposing upon the donee, not a
mere privilege of exercising the power, but a duty to exercise
it. In short, the legal conception of a power in trust involves
a power plus a "duty." That this is the distinguishing mark of
a power in trust has often been indicated by courts and by tex-t
writers.4 To quote the statement of Lord Eldon from Broinv v.
Higgs 5, so often repeated with approval in the cases:
"But there are not only a mere trust and a mere power, but
there is also known to this Court a power, which the party, to
whom it is given, is entrusted and required to execute; and with
regard to that species of power the Court consider it as partak-
ing so much of the nature and qualities of a trust that if the
person who has that duty imposed upon him, does not discharge
it, the Court will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his
room and place."
But though a power in trust is always imperative, it may, and
SThat a power in trust is imperative was recognized in the following
cases: Grieveson v. Kirsopp, 2 Keen 653 (1838); In re Hall [1899] 1
Ir. R. 308; Burrough v. Philcox, 5 Mly. & Cr. 73 (1840); In re Brierley, 43
W'kly Rep. 36 (1894); Brook v. Brook, 3 Si. & G. 280 (185G); Brown v.
Higgs, 8 Yes. 561 (1803); In re Weekes' Settlement [1897] 1 Ch. 289; In re
Llewellyn's Settlement [1921] 2 Ch. 281; In re Combe [1925] Ch. 210;
Gorin v. Gordon, 38 Miss. 205 (1859); Cady v. Lincoln, 100 Miss. 765, 57
So. 213 (1911); Greenough v. Welles, 10 Cush. 571 (Mlass. 1852); Dominick
v. Sayre, 3 Sanf. 555 (N.Y. Super. 1850); Stoughton v. Liscomb, 39 RI.
489, 98 AtI. 183 (1916); Milhollen's Adm'r v. Rice, sipra note 3. See also
People v. Kaiser, 306 Il. 313, 137 N.E. 826 (1922).
This has frequently been said, also by text writers. EDWArmS, CoxEY-
ANCiNG (5th ed. 1922) 167 reads as follows: "But a mere power of appoint-
ment must be distinguished, in this respect, from a trust or duty, to be
carried out by a person by means of a power vested in him-as where land
or money is given to the children of a person, in such shares as he -hall
appoint, and there is no gift to the children in default of appointment.
Such a power as this is called a power imperative, or (more usually) a
power in the nature of a trust.'
1 REEVES, REAL PROPERTY (1909) § 333: "That is, a power in trust, in
its essential nature, places upon the donee thereof a ditty to execute it, and
thereby to dispose of property, in favor of some person or perzons other
than himself." Other texts which declare that a power in trust is imper-
ative are: 3 PomExnoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1002;
LEAxE, PROPERTY IN LAND (2d ed. 1909) § 308; 1 PERRY, TRUSTs (6th ed.
1911) § 248; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 317.
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generally does involve discretionary elements. The donee may
have the privilege of deciding the size of the shares, the members
from the class who will take, and the time when he will exercise
the power. But if he is under a duty to exercise it at some time
and under some conditions, then it may properly be said to be
imperative.
On the other hand, if the donor of the power makes it optional
with the donee whether he exercise the power or not, it is not a
power in trust.6 An example of that type of power is found in
the recent case of In re Combe. There, property was put in
trust for the testator's son "and from and after his death in
trust for such person or persons as my said son shall by will
appoint, but I direct that such appointment must be confined to
any relation or relations of the whole blood." The son desired
to release the power and wished to know whether there would
be an intestacy as to the remainder after his death. The court
held that there would. "Am I able, from this language, to say,"
observed the court, "that in fact the testator has created for a
certain class of persons a trust and that there was a duty on
the son to execute that trust and that, if he failed to execute it,
the court would execute it, and hold that the members of the
class took equally between them?"
While the notion that a power in trust is imperative seems
well enough established, two other conceptions of the term de-
serve mention. In a learned article in the Harvard Law Re-
view 8 Professor Gray defined a power in trust as "a power which
imposes upon the donee a duty to exercise it, enforceable in
equity." In the course of his discussion he took the position that
only powers appendant are enforceable in equity, and that, there-
fore, they only are properly termed powers in trust.9 But in
effect Professor Gray appears to have conceded that the term
power in trust is commonly applied by the courts to powers
which are not appendant. And, in fact, most of his discussion
is directed to the legal consequences of the donee's failure to
exercise the power, a subject which will be considered later.
6Supra note 4, at 569.
6 Brook v. Brook, supra note 4.
7 Supra note 4.
s Gray, Powers in Trust and Gifts Implied in Default of Appointments
(1911) 25 HARV. L. Rav. 1.
9 The following statement from 23 HALSBUnY, LAWs OF ENGLAND (1912)
69, is in accord with Professor Gray's view:
"The distinction between trusts and powers is that, while the court will
compel the execution of a trust, it cannot compel the execution of a power;
but there are powers which in their nature are fiduciary, in the sense that
the donee of the power is a trustee for the exercise of the power, and has
an interest extensive enough to allow of its exercise, and in these cases
the court does not allow the non-execution of the power to defeat the in-
tention of the donor."
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It should also be observed that under the statutory system of
powers in effect in New York 10 and a few other states, a power
in trust is not necessarily imperative. Mr. Rood, apparently in-
fluenced by such statutory definitions, in the recent edition of
his text on Wills, defines a power in trust as follows :"'
"Trust powers are those in which the person having the
power, though not necessarily bound to exercise it, nor neces-
sarily having any title to the property, cannot lawfully appoint
himself or appropriate to himself the proceeds of the exercise
of the power, but has merely a duty to exercise a discretion as
to whether and if so how to appoint or convey for the benefit
of others."
The decision in the case of It re Combe, already referred to,
is inconsistent with Mr. Rood's definition. He cites no authority
for it, and it is believed that, outside those jurisdictions having
statutory systems of powers, the decisions do not sustain his
position. As an exposition of statutory powers in trust is beyond
the scope of this paper, it will be assumed that statutory sys-
tems of powers are excluded from the further course of this
discussion.
However, merely to say that the distinguishing mark of a
power in trust is its imperative character is of small importance.
The significant question is: What legal consequences arise from
the fact that a power is imperative? Suppose the donee of a
power refuses to exercise it or dies without exercising it. If
the power is not in trust, obviously nothing can be done about
the donee's omission. He has the privilege of refusing to exer-
cise the power. Hence, no one has a right to compel him to
2 ON. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 51 on Real Property Law, includes
the following sections:
"Sec. 137. GENERAL POWER IN TRUST. A general power is in trust where
any person or class of persons, other than the grantee of the power, is
designated as entitled to the proceeds, or any portion of the proceeds, or
other benefits to result from its execution.
"Sec. 138. SPECIAL PoWER iN TRUST. A special power is in trust where
either,
1. The disposition or charge which it authorizes is limited to be made
to a person or class of persons, other than the grantee of the power; or
2. A person or class of persons, other than the grantee, is designatca
as entitled to any benefits, from the disposition or charge authorized by the
power.
"Sec. 157. WHEN A TRUST POWER Is I .PERATIVE. A trust power, unlezs
its execution or non-execution is made expressly to depend on the will
of the grantee, is imperative, and imposes a duty on the grantee,
the performance of which may be compelled for the benefit of the person
interested. A trust power does not cease to be imperative where the gran-
tee has the right to select any, and exclude others, of the perzons designated
as the beneficiaries of the trust."
13 ROOD, WiLLs (2d ed. 1926) § 758 j.
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exercise it. But if it be a power in trust, then the creator of
the power has intended to impose a duty on the donee to exer-
cise it. And the question is: What remedies, if any, does the
law provide for the enforcement of the donee's duty? That courts
have attempted to do something in the direction of carrying
out the donor's wishes does not admit of doubt. Take, for
example, the typical case (already suggested by the discussion
of Millhollen's Adm'r v. Rice) where property is given to A for
life and A is directed to appoint the. fee among the children of B
in such shares as he may determine. If A dies without exercis-
ing the power, the children of B are regularly given the property
in equal shares. Three theories have been advanced to explain
this result: first, that the donee of the power is a trustee, the
power itself being the trust res, and the class of possible appoint-
ees the beneficiaries ;12 second, that unless the power is append-
ant, equity will do nothing toward enforcing the exercise of
the power, but that, purely as a matter of construction, a gift in
default of appointment will regularly be implied in favor of the
class of possible objects of the power; and, third, that if the
donee dies without exercising the power, a constructive trust will
attach to the property in favor of the objects of the power.
With reference to the first theory to the effect that the power
itself is a trust res, objection may be made upon the ground
that a prime essential to a trust is that specific property must
constitute its subject matter. If one is inclined to be over tech-
nical, such an objection must inevitably be sustained. It is
true, the usual view of the courts is that a power is not prop-
erty. 3 But equity has recognized some other rather tenuous
legal relations as constituting a sufficient res to create a trust,
14
and it is difficult to see why tle doctrines of trusts could not be
extended to apply to such a trust res as this. However, even if
we apply the analogy of trusts, our difficulties do not end. If the
12 See BOGERT, TRusTs (1921) 35: "A power in trust is a trust in which
the trust res is a power to dispose of property; .... "1 And at 36: "The
donee of a power in trust is a trustee."
See also PoMEROY, loc. cit. supra note 4: "Analogous to trusts proper,
but differing from them in one essential feature, are powers in trust. In
.t true trust the legal title is in and by its creation always vested in the
trustee, but to be held for the benefit of the beneficiary... Where the power
is in trust, A may have some discretion with respect to the mode in which
he shall exercise it . . .but he has no discretion as to whether he will or
will not exercise it at all. It partakes so much of the nature of a trust,
that an obligation rests upon him, and an equitable right is held by the
beneficiariesi-a right which equity recognizes and to a certain extent
protects; so that if A does not discharge the duty resting upon him, a
court will, to a certain extent, discharge the duty in his stead."
i Ex parte Gilchrist, 17 Q. B. D. 521 (1886),; 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 310; (1908) 8 COL. L. REv. 652.
14 (1927) 36 YALE LAW JouRNAL 394.
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power is a trust res, it has peculiarities of its own which make
it difficult for equity to aid directly in cases of non-execution.
In the first place, though the power in trust be imperative, there
are usually discretionary elements. As a rule, the donee has the
option of exercising it at any time during his life; and all that
the donor intended is that he must exercise it at some time or
other. Hdnce, until he dies, the donee has never violated his
duty, and there is nothing for which he can be sued.15 This as-
pect is not peculiar to a power unaccompanied by property. If
the donee had the title in fee, equity would still refuse to exer-
cise the power if it were discretionary. Second, most powers
are intended to be purely personal to the donee; that is, they are
to be exercised by him personally and by no one else; hence, they
are intended to terminate on his death.10 Now it seems clear
that a power will last no longer than the donor intended it to
last. Consequently, in some cases, after the donee is dead, the
power has terminated. While equity may produce a result simi-
lar to that intended by the donor, in such cases the court can
hardly be said to exercise the power. Thus, even if we say that
the donee is a trustee of the power, we still must conclude that
in effectuating the purpose of the trust, equity will have to pro-
ceed in a different manner from that in the case of the enforce-
ment of ordinary trust duties not involving powers. In other
words, the donee of a power in trust is a unique kind of fiduciary;
whether we do or do not call him a trustee will make little differ-
ence in the solution of the problems involving such powers. We
still have the unanswered question: What remedies does the
law provide for the non-execution of the power?
The second theory is that advanced by Professor Gray. He
states his view in these words: 17
"When a legal estate is given to A for life, and a power is
given to A or to B to appoint the remainder, if the objects of
15 While there are occasional remarks indicating the contrary, the later
decisions are to the effect that, whether it be a trust or a power, equity
does not exercise a discretion given to the trustee or donee. See Fnvr.,
PowErs (3d ed. 1916) 53, 54; SUGDEN, PowuS (8th ed. 18G1) 601; Gray,
op. cit. s.pra note 8, at 4.
There are, however, occasional statements which imply that the court
is exercising the power. See In re Phene's Trusts, L.R. 5 Eq. 346, 348
(1868), where the court observes: "The court is performing the office of
executors and must give it to the same persons."
16 Of course, whether a power is personal or not, or whether it is intended
to attach to the office for the time being, is a matter of construction. And
it must further be recognized that at the present time the rule as to the
survival of some types of powers is modified by statute. On the construc-
tion of powers with reference to their survival, see KALe, FuTuRE IxN=-
ESTS (2d ed. 1920) §§ 624-633.
.7 Gray, op. cit. supra note 8, at 3.
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the power take in default of appointment, they must take by an
implied gift; equity has nothing to do with it."
He then points out,"8 quoting from Lord St. Leonards, that in
Brown v. Higgs, Lord Eldon, in laying down a general principle
concerning powers in trust, qualified that principle by limiting
it to cases where the testator has given the donee an interest in
the property sufficient to enable him to discharge the duty im-
posed by the will. That is, if, in the exercise of the power, the
donee will only affect property interests to which he has title,
we may call it a power in trust, and equity will effectuate it by
attaching a trust to the property for the benefit of the objects
of the power. But if his power is in gross or purely collateral,
that is, if some one else has title to the property over which the
power is to be exercised, equity will not aid in enforcing the
duty the testator has imposed upon the donee. Professor Gray
then states the rule as follows:
"When a special power in gross or simply collateral to appoint
to a class is given, and there is no gift over in default of appoint-
ment, and no appointment is made, the objects of the power take
by implication the estate or interest that might have been ap-
pointed to them."
No doubt Professor Gray was correct in saying that equity
does not exercise a discretion, and that, therefore, equity would
not exercise a power. But it does not necessarily follow that
"equity has nothing to do with it." Some other equitable remedy
may be possible even though the court will not exercise the
power.
Such a remedy is suggested in the constructive trust theory,
which was put forward by the late Professor Albert M. Kales."D
His view was that if the donee of such a power in trust died with-
out executing it, the class of persons from whom the appoint-
men was to be made would take the property by way of a con-
structive trust which was imposed upon the property in the
hands of those to whom it had come by default of appointment;
18 Mr. Gray's language is as follows: "It was the acute mind of Lord St.
Leonards which first perceived that when the objects of a power take upon
failure to appoint, they take by an implied gift. In the first edition of his
book on Powers published in 1808, he said: 'In Brown v. Higgs, 8 Ves. 574,
Lord Eldon stated the principle in all cases on this subject to be, that if the
power is a power which it is the duty of the party to execute, made his
duty by the requisition of the will put upon him as such by the testator,
who has given him an interest extensive enough to enable him to discharge
it, he is a trustee for the exercise of the power.' The important words
here are 'who has given him an interest extensive enough to enable him to
discharge it,' and that Lord St. Leonards thought so is shown by the fact that
in later editions of the book these words are printed in italics."
19 KALEs, op. cit. supra note 16, § 637.
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and that when equity distributed it equally to the members of
the class, equity was enforcing a trust which arose from the
failure of the donee to do his duty. The trust is called construc-
tive because the creator of the power did not intend to create the
trust. Equity simply imposes a remedy in view of the impossibil-
ity of the beneficiaries taking in the precise manner intended;
and the unjust enrichment of the donor's heir, or other person
into whose hands the property may have come, is sufficient jus-
tification for equity imposing the trust.
It is believed that this last theory presents the most satisfac-
tory solution of the problem of the non-execution of powers in
trust. That this view is preferable to the implied gift doctrine
may perhaps best be considered by comparing the two theories.
First, however, something of a digression is advisable to con-
sider one type of power in trust to which the constructive trust
theory is clearly applicable, namely, the power of an executor,
created by the will, to sell land for the payment of debts and
legacies.
Before the Statutes of Uses and of Wills, there were certain
localities in England in which devises of legal interests in land
were permitted by custom. In those localities, so Littleton tells
us,2 0 a testator might provide in his will that his executor should
have a power to sell his land to distribute for his soul. This was
not a devise of the land to the executor. It only gave him a
power. But it was a power which it was his duty to exercise.
It must be remembered, of course, that at that time an executor
had no authority to sell land to pay debts and legacies unless a
testator so provided; the land passed directly to the heir or
devisee. By the passing of the Statute of Wills in 1540, it be-
came possible for any testator to create such a power in his
executor, since lands then became generally devisable. Such a
power has been called a common law power, since it existed at
common law and before the Statutes of Uses and of Wills. Yet
it may be doubted whether there is any reason today for dis-
tinguishing between such a power and a power operating by way
of a shifting use or executory devise. Certainly a w,.ills statute is
essential to the exercise of such a power in this country. And
its operation would seem to be substantially like a power oper-
ating by way of executory devise.
It is clear that the common law power of sale of an executor
has always been regarded as a power in trust.Y-  Lord Coke
speaks of such a power as a "bare trust" and as a "trust or
authority." 22 Mr. Justice Bigelow, in the case of Grecizough v.
20 LITTLEToN, TENUREs § *169.
217 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 171, 172, outlinc. its
early development.
22 Co. LrrT. §§ *113 a, and "181b.
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Welles,23 stated the attitude of the courts toward such powers as
these in the following language:
"But there is a clear and well defined distinction between
a mere power, when the act is left to the will of the party to
whom it is given, and powers in the nature of trusts. In cases
of the latter class, the rights and interests of third parties, who
are beneficially interested in the trusts which arise and grow
out of the execution of the power, come in, and can be enforced
as against the party to whom the power is given. Mere powers
are never imperative; trusts are always imperative and obliga-
tory upon the conscience of the party intrusted. When a trust
is to be effected by the execution of a power, then the trust and
power become blended and binding upon the donee of the power.
The most familiar instance given in the books of such a union, is
the case where a power is given by a will to sell an estate with
directions to apply the proceeds upon trusts. The power is then
in the nature of a trust."
As early as the seventeenth century we find a line of English
cases in which it is said that equity may fasten a trust on the
heir, where a testator directed his executor to sell lands.2
4
In Yates v. Compton,25 the testator provided in his will that
his executors should sell his land and purchase an annuity of
one hundred pounds per annum for the life of Jane Styles out of
which she should also maintain her children, and gave thirty
pounds for each child to be raised out of this annuity and his
personal estate. B and C, the executors, renounced the office.
Jane Styles also died soon after the testator. Action being
brought by the administrator with the will annexed of the tes-
tator's estate, who was also administrator of the estate of Jane
Styles, to compel the heir to join in a sale, the Chancellor de-
creed the land to be sold to provide for the children's legacies.
The same doctrine has been recognized in American cases.20
23 Supra note 4, at 576.
24 Garfoot v. Garfoot, 1 Chan. Cas. 35 (1663) ; Asby v. Doyl, I Chan. CaOn.
180. And see Locton v. Locton, 2 Freeman Ch. 136 (1637); Pitt v. Pelham,
2 Freeman Ch. 134 (1670).
See also Butler and Hargrave's note to Co. LiTT. § *113 a, where the fol-
lowing language occurs, in connection with the discussion of an executor's
power to sell land: "This has long been the practice of our courts of equity;
these rightly ,deeming the purpose for which the testator directs the money
arising from the sale to be applied, to be the substantial part of the devise,
and the persons named to execute the power of selling to be mere trustees;
which brings the case within the general rule of equity, that a trust shall
never fail of execution for want of a trustee, and that if one is wanting
the court shall execute the office. The relief is administered by considering
the land in whatever person vested, as bound by the trust, and compelling
the heir, or other person having the legal estate, to perform it."
25 2 P. Wins. 308 (1725).
26 Greenough v. Welles, supra note 4; Cady v. Lincoln, suprWa note 4;
Stoughton v. Liscomb, supra note 4; see Compton v. McMahan, 19 Mo. App.
494, 510 (1885).
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And it appears that equity does not necessarily order the heir
to act, but the court may proceed to make the sale by its owmn
order. In Ca4y v. Lincoln, a comparatively recent Mississippi
case involving a power of sale by an executor, (though not
primarily to pay debts and legacies) the testator left the residue
of the property to be sold by his executor, the proceeds to be
applied to the payment of debts, and the residue to be held by
the executor on certain specified trusts for the testator's children.
The executor died without selling the land. The interested par-
ties filed a bill to have the land sold, and this was done by a
commissioner in chancery. This case involves the validity of
the sale, the court holding it valid. The court pointed out that
the executor took no title to the lands, and then observed:
"Bell, the executor, never sold the property, never exercised
the trust confided in him, and, in view of the proposition that
equity will never permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee,
the trust still existed. But his trust was not in the property
itself-that is, the land-but the proceeds of the sale. . . The
beneficiaries had a right to have the property sold, not only for
the purpose of partition, but under the express direction of the
will. The direction as to selling was mandatory; it was necessary
to sell in order to execute the trust."
It should be remarked that so far as cases involving the pow-
ers of executors to-day are concerned, the rule discussed has
little practical significance. An executor or administrator may
now sell to pay debts under statutory powers. And in some
jurisdictions such a power is, by statute, made to survive the
executor's death. But the principle laid down in these cases,
that equity will effectuate the purpose of an imperative pover
by means of a constructive trust, is believed to be applicable to
other powers, including powers of appointment. Moreover, these
decisions on the powers of an executor clearly indicate that there
are powers in trust which are not appendant, and that equity
provides a remedy for their non-execution. Even Lord St.
Leonards, who is cited for the proposition that properly spealdng
only powers appendant are powers in trust, has no hesitation
in classifying as a power in trust the power of an executor
created by the will.23
To return to a comparison of the constructive trust theory
with the implied gift theory, perhaps the most serious objection
to the latter is the inherent difficulty, as a matter of construction,
in reading any such limitation into a will or settlement. The
whole notion of a power of the kind we are here considering
is that it is imperative; in other words, that the donor intended
27 Supra note 4.
2S SUGDEN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 588, 589.
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that the donee at some time should exercise the power and gave
him no option as to whether or not he should exercise it. Now
if we are construing the donor's intent, it is hard to infer any
gift in default of appointment when the donor did not contem-
plate any default in the appointment. Indeeed, the case where
the power is imperative is exactly the situation in which we
would not expect the donor to intend a gift over in default of
appointment. To put an extreme case: suppose the testator
says: "I give Blackacre to X for life and direct that he appoint
the remainder to such one or more of his children as he sees fit.
I make no provision in case he fails to appoint because I impose
a duty on him to do so and expect him to fulfill it." It would
seem that under no theory of implying a testator's intention
could the children of X take if X failed to appoint, for we cannot
construe a will contrary to an expressed intention. If the chil-
dren of X take in that case, they take by constructive trust. Yet
certainly it seems as desirable to allow the children to take in
this case as in a case where the testator had not made the power
imperative.
Another aspect of the cases which militates against the im-
plied gift theory is this. The rule has been frequently laid down
that only those members of the class take who might have taken
by an appointment had one been made.29  For example, if there
is a devise to A for life, with a direction to A to appoint the
remainder by will to such of his children as he may select, the
question may arise whether the children of A who predecease
him will be entitled to share in a distribution to the children as
a class when A dies without making an appointment. In such
a case the property has been distributed equally to those children
who survived the donee of the power. Now, if equity is merely
trying to carry out as far as possible the wishes of the testator
by means of a constructive trust, that result seems reasonable.
But it appears to make an exceedingly forced construction of the
testator's intent to say that he intended a gift in default of ap-
pointment which is not vested. For it must be remembered that
since the decision in Doe d. Willis v. Martin," a remainder in
default of appointment is vested, in the absence of elements
which would make it contingent. Now, if the gift in default of
appointment is not vested, then the testator may not have dis-
29 Lambert v. Thwaites, L.R. 2 Eq. 151 (1866); Moore v. Ffolliot, L.R. Ir.
19 Ch. Div. 499 (1887); Stolworthy v. Sancroft, 33 L.J. Ch. 708 (1864); In
re Phene's Trusts, supra note 15; Walsh v. Wallinger, 2 Russ. & My. 78
(1830); Re White's Trusts, Johns. 656 (1860); Halfhead v. Shepherd, 28
L.J.Q.B. 248 (1859). See also Connell v. Cole, 89 Ala. 381, 8 So. 72 (1890);
SuGDEN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 595, 596. But see Cruse, Adm'r v. McKee,
2 Head 1 (Tenn. 1858).
30 4 Term R. 39 (1790).
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posed of the whole fee. Thus the argument so often made that
a provision is implied in a will because the testator did not in-
tend to die intestate would not apply with the same force to an
implication of a contingent gift in default, as to a vested gift in
default. Of course, it is entirely possible to imply a contingent
gift in default of appointment, if there is language in the will to
show such an intent. But to imply such a gift as a general
rule looks very much as if the court were making a will for the
testator.
Another aspect of the decisions which lends itself more read-
ily to the constructive trust theory is involved in the rule that,
in the absence of an appointment, there may be a distribution
to the class even though there is a residuary clause.?' It is con-
ceded, of course, that if there is an express gift in default of
appointment, there can be no implied gift.: There would like-
wise be no constructive trust, for if the testator made a gift in
default of appointment, he would hardly intend an imperative
power; besides, equity would not impose a trust vhich would
defeat the express gift. But if there is merely a residuary clause,
that in itself does not prevent a distribution to the class in a
case where no appointment has been made. Now the existence
of a residuary clause is not inconsistent with the recognition of a
constructive trust for the class. But if we say the class take by
implied gift, we are cutting down the size of an express gift of
the residue; and we are not making the implication to prevent
intestacy, for the residuary clause prevents an intestacy whether
a gift in default is implied or not.
The next question to be asked is: To what extent is the pro-
posed analysis sustained by the decisions? It must be conceded
that, with the exception of the cases involving powers of sale
of executors, the language of the courts is not such as to indi-
cate undeniably that the court is imposing a trust, nor is the
term "constructive trust" used.3 3 Most of the cases leave us
31 Rogers v. Rogers, 2 Head 660 (Tenn. 1859); In re Brierley, -psra
note 4.
32 See FARwELL, op. cit. supra note 15, at 533.
'3 See, however, Little v. Neil, 10 W'kly Rep. 592 (1862), where the
court, in declaring an equal distribution to a class on refusal of the trus-
tees to appoint, remarked: "but under the present circumstances the court
was not exercising the discretion of the trustees nor construing the settle-
ment."
See also Hazard v. Bacon, 42 R. I. 415, 419, 108 AtI. 499, 501 (1920),
where, on the death of the trustees without exercising the power, the court
ordered an equal distribution, observing that though the court could not
exercise the discretion of the original trustee, it would not permit the gen-
eral intention of the testator to fail, "but will order a division of the trust
estate among the members of the class, for whose benefit the trust estate
was created, in accordance with the most equitable rule, which in this ease
is that of equality."
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somewhat in doubt as to the precise theory on which the property
is being distributed in lieu of an appointment. Quite often the
language is of such a character as to make it impossible to tell
whether the court is talking about a gift by implication of a
trust. For example, in the case of In re Weekes' Settlement,5 '
the court, after considering whether it was a "mere power" and
not "one coupled with a trust that he was bound to exercise,"
concluded that it was not a power in trust and said: "I hold that
in this case there was no gift by implication."
In some of the cases where the donee was given the legal title
to the property, the courts have talked about powers in trust,
but the real problem was simply whether the donee was given the
property absolutely or whether he held it in trust." For example,
the testator devises to A in fee, but expresses a desire that A may
distribute the property on his death to the testator's relations. If
these words are imperative, there is a trust; if not, the words
are mere surplusage, and A takes an absolute fee without any
duty in respect to it. Those cases resemble the ones we have
discussed in that, if the direction is imperative, equity will aid
in enforcing the duty imposed. However, there is no dispute as
to the rule to be applied in those cases.
A second group of cases about which there is no dispute, and
in which powers in trust are sometimes discussed, involves the
following type of situation. The testator devises to X in trust
for the children of Y with a power in X to determine the shares
which the children of Y shall take. Here the children of Y have
a vested gift subject to a power. If X fails to make the appoint-
ment, the children of Y take, not by implication, and not by con-
structive trust, but by direct gift.36
In most of the cases which involve powers in trust, nothing
is made of the fact that the donee may or may not have had a
legal title which would be affected by the discharge of the
power. In Milhollen's Adm'?r v. Rice, already referred to,, the
court discussed the point in these words:
34 Supra note 4. Another typical statement in which the two ideas are
blended is the following from WILLiAms, EXECUTORS (10th ed. 1905) 878:
"In order to imply a gift there must be a clear indication in the will that
the testator intended the power to be regarded as in the nature of a trust,
so that the class or some of the class should take."
It should be noted, however that Gray and Sugden clearly differentiated
the two ideas.
35 Examples of this kind of problem are found in Harding v. Glyn, 1
Atk. 469 (1739) ; Pierson v. Garnett, 2 Bro. C.C. 38 (1786) ; Brook v. Brook,
supra note 4.
36 Such appears to have been the situation in the following cases: Millikin
v. Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460 (1882); Lambert v. Thwaites, supra note 29;
In re Hughes [1921] 2 Ch. 208.
37Supra note 3, at 565.
POWERS IN TRUST
"It is always sufficient that the donee of such a power has a
life interest in the power [property (?)] he is thus authorized
to dispose of in fee simple among a definite class, in order that
such a power may be held to be a power in the nature of a trust.
The fact, that the donee of such a power has not a fee simple
interest, but is only a tenant for life, will not affect the construc-
tion of the power, or prevent it from being regarded as a power
in the nature of a trust."
In Dominick v. Sayre,38 a New York case decided in 1850, after
the statutory system of powers was enacted in that state, but
involving limitations created before the statutes went into effect,
and to which, therefore, the statutes were inapplicable, the facts
were as follows. The testator gave eight lots of land to his
daughter for life, with "power to give the same by deed or will
to any of the male descendants of my family of the name of
Dominick." In an action to determine whether the property, on
default of appointment, went to the residuary devisees on the
death of the donee, or to the class, the court decreed a distribu-
tion to the class as the beneficiaries of a power in trust. In the
opinion the decision of Lord Cottenham in Burrough v. Philcox
was referred to with approval, the court observing that:
"It is immaterial in whom the fee is vested at the time the
power is to be executed, if the persons to whom the property
is to be or may be given by an executor of the power are desig-
nated with sufficient certainty. There is then a trust in their
favor."
The court further remarked that:
"A power, when the disposition which it authorizes is limited to
a particular class, unless its execution is made in terms to depend
upon the mere discretion of the grantee, always creates a rea-
sonable presumption that the grantor means that it shall be
executed, and his intention thus ascertained, a court of equity
is bound to effectuate by construing the power as imperative."
Most of the other American cases are rather inconclusive on
the aspects of the question so far considered. In some the
language is that of implied gift; in some, that of powers in
trust, and in others the two ideas are confused."" None, however,
38 Supra note 4.
39 Supra note 4.
401n the following cases, in addition to the two discussed, the decision
is in the language of imperative power, or power in trust. Withers v. Yea-
don, 1 Rich. Eq. 324 (S.C. 1845), where, however, the court expressed the
view that a power in trust must be coupled with a property interest suffi-
cient to enable the donee to discharge it; Wetmore v. Henry, 259 Ill. SO,
102 N.E. 189 (1913).
In the following, the language of implied gift is used. Loosing v. Loos-
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are necessarily inconsistent with the position herein taken; nor
is there any denial, in the cases not involving statutory systems
of powers, of the proposition that a power in trust is always
imperative.
The English cases are more numerous. In the leading English
case of Brown v. Higgs, from which quotation has already been
made,4 . the court without doubt proceeded on the theory that it
was dealing with an imperative power, and the language of
Lord Eldon in that decision has been quoted with approval time
after time. In that case, however, the donee of the power had
the legal title. Hence, the facts in that case would not present
a situation where the power in trust theory would be put to
the crucial test.
In Burrough v. Philcox, the testator gave certain real and per-
sonal estate in fee in trust with life interests to his son and
daughter and gifts over to their issue; he then provided that if
both children should die without leaving lawful issue the sur-
vivor should have the power to dispose by will of the property
among the testator's nephews and nieces or their children. The
son and daughter having both died without children, and no
appointment having been made, Lord Cottingham held that the
nephews and nieces and their children would take the unap-
pointed property as a class. He concluded that the power was
imperative and observed:
"Much argument was urged at the bar upon the ground that
the donee of the power had no estate in the property under the
will beyond a life interest. In my view of the case this is quite
immaterial. It is not, certainly, one of those cases in which
property is given, with expressions added, as to the disposal of
it, which are held to fix a trust upon the gift; but the whole is
given to trustees, and the question is whether there be found
in the will a sufficient declaration of who, in the events which
have happened, are to be the cestuis que trust; and if that be
sufficiently expressed, it is immaterial whether the donee of the
power be also a trustee, or whether the trust be vested in others."
In the case of In re Weekes' Settlement,42 so severely criticised
by Professor Gray, the facts were as follows. By a marriage
settlement E.W. was given a general power to appoint by will,
ing, 85 Neb. 66, 122 N.W. 707 (1909); McGaughey's Adm'r v. Henry, 15
B. Mon. 383 (Ky. 1854); Rogers v. Rogers, supra note 31. In the latter
case the court referred to the power in trust doctrine, but finally based its
decision on implied gift. In Tomlinson v. Nickell, 24 W. Va. 148 (1884),
language of power in trust and of implied gift seem to be used interchange-
ably. In Varrel v. Wendell, 20 N. H. 431 (1846), the court's theory as to
this aspect of the case does not clearly appear. The same may be said of
Pitts v. Howard, 208 Ala. 380, 94 So. 495 (1922).
4" Supra note 5.
42Supra note 4.
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and in default of appointment, the property was to go to the
persons who would be entitled to take by descent if E.W. died
intestate and a widow. E.W. appointed a life interest to her
husband together with "the power to dispose of all such property
by will amongst our children in accordance with the power
granted to him as regards the other property which I have under
my marriage settlements." The husband died without exercising
the power given him by his wife's will. The court refused to
hold that the children would take. Romer, J., in his opinion,
clearly shows that the class would not take in this kind of case
unless the power were imperative. He says:
"The authorities do not show in my opinion, that there is a
hard and fast rule that a gift to A for life with a power to A
to appoint among a class and nothing more, must, if there is no
gift over in the will, be held a gift by implication to the class
in default of the power being exercised. In my opinion the cases
show (though there may be found here and there certain re-
marks of a few learned judges which, if not interpreted by the
facts of the particular case before them, might seem to have a
more extended operation) that you must find in the will an in-
dication that the testatrix did intend the class or some of the
class to take-intended that the power should be regarded in
the nature of a trust-only a power of selection being given, as,
for example, a gift to A for life with gift over to such of a class
as A shall appoint."
Following In re Weekes' Settlemeiit is the case of 1t re
Combe,"3 already referred to, which clearly lays down the rule
that the power must be imperative if the property is to go to
the class on failure of the donee to appoint.
In Moore v. Ffollot, 4 4 (an earlier case), however, we find a
repudiation of the power in trust idea as applied to collateral
powers and powers in gross. In the course of its discussion, the
court stated that in a case of that sort, if the members of the
class took at all, they would take by implication.,I The facts
of that case, however, can be explained quite as well on a theory
of constructive trust as on any other. Property had been left
to the testator's three nieces for life with a power to appoint
43 Supra note 4.
"Supra note 29.
45 The language is as follows: "There is, however, a distinct class of
cases where the donee of the power takes not more than a life estate. In
these, however clear the expression of desire on the part of the donee in
favor of a particular person or class of persons may be, yet as the donee
has no estate, or none beyond his life, the trust to exercise the power is as
such personal, and does not directly attach upon the inJleritance, save in so
far as the court finds in the language an implication in favor of the objects
of the power in default of appointment. In this case if they take the estate
they take it by implication, and thus by way of limitation under the instru-
ment creating the power."
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by will to the testator's grandnephew if he conducted himself
properly. The grandnephew predeceased two of the nieces, and
no appointment was made. The court simply decided that,
though there might have been an implied gift to the grand-
nephew if he had survived, there was none under the circum-
stances which had transpired.
It must be conceded that many English cases purport to be
decided on a doctrine of implied gift. In practically all these
cases, however, the court was dealing with property which was
in trust pending the appointment. In such a case the process
of giving relief would be identical whether the implied gift the-
ory or the constructive trust theory were applied. Suppose a
testator devises Blackacre to T in fee in trust for A for life and
then directs A to appoint the beneficiaries in remainder from
among his children, and A dies without so appointing. If equity
imposes a constructive trust in favor of the children it will be
imposed upon T. If there is an implied gift, it is an implied
equitable gift, in other words, an implied trust in favor of the
children, T being the trustee. It may be surmised that such a
situation as this is responsible for the oft recurring observation
that, because there is a power in trust, there is an implied gift.
It is believed that so far no reported case, either American or
English, has been decided which tests absolutely the question
whether the court is applying a trust theory or an implied gift
theory. But cases could be put which would test the point. For
example, suppose the usual situation: a power to appoint land
to a class, which would be construed as designed to impose a
duty on the donee to appoint, and the death of the donee without
appointment. If the class takes by implication from the will, the
members of the class could bring trespass or ejectment for the
land. If their rights are equitable, they might be forced first
to file a bill in equity to get the legal title. Professor Kales also
suggests that if the class were to take by way of trust, their
rights might be defeated by a bona fide purchaser, but if they
took by implication, that could not happen. Suffice it to say, it
is hard to think of a case where the land would be likely to come
into the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Hence, whether one
regards the class as taking by a gift in default of appointment
or by a trust depends on the viewpoint which appeals to him as
the more reasonable. But it seems clear that the ideas of an
imperative power and of a gift by implication are utterly incon-
sistent.
One aspect of these decisions on powers of appointment, of a
more practical character, is this: Must there be evidence of an
intent to make the power imperative, or does the mere provision
for a power to appoint to a definite class raise a presumption that
it is imperative, in the absence of language to the contrary? Or,
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if we state it in Professor Gray's terninology: Is there an im-
plied gift in default, in the absence of language to the contrary,
merely because there is a power to appoint to the class?
As we have seen, Mr. Gray thought there was such a fixed
rule, and Mr. Farwell was of the same opinion. 5 There was,
without doubt, a body of English authority supporting that
view.4 7 On the other hand, there was a line of English cases
which seems to have required something more than the mere
existence of a power to appoint to the class.19 Then came the
case of In 'e Weekes' Settlement, which, as we have seen, refused
to lay down the hard and fast rule that a power to appoint to
a definite class raises a trust for the class. The facts of that
case were peculiar. The donor of the power in question created
it by virtue of a general power which she had, and there was
already a specific provision in default of the exercise of this
general power. Thus there was, in a way, already a provision
in default of appointment. It has sometimes been thought that
this provision distinguishes the case from some of the earlier
decisions. In his decision, Romer, J., though he pointed out
that element, did not base his conclusion entirely on that fact.
In the case of In re Combe, already referred to, where the limi-
tation was to "Such person or persons as my son shall by will
appoint, but I direct that such appointment must be confined
to any relation or relations of mine of the whole blood," the
court followed the doctrine of In re Wecckcs' Settlcicnt and re-
fused to find a power in trust. These cases, it is believed, mark
a departure in the English law. Whether a power to appoint
to the children of X is a power in trust is a question of fact.
The court would quite likely determine that such a power was
imperative, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary
intent, but it is believed that there is no rule of law to that
effect.4 9
46 FRWELL, op. cit supra note 15, at 528.
47Such a rule was announced in Kennedy v. Kingston, 2 Jac. & W. 430
(1821); Lambert v. Thwaites, supra note 29; Wilson v. Duguid, 24 Ch. D.
244 (1883) ; Stolworthy v. Sancroft, supra note 29.
4 8 Duke of Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 01 (1750); Healy v.
Donnery, 3 Ir. Com. L. Rep. 213 (1853) ; In re Hall, supra note 4; Carberry
v. McCarthy, L. R. Ir. 7 Ch. Div. 328 (1881).
49 See In re Llewellyn's Settlement, supra note 4, which involved a settle-
ment by which property was given in trust on the death of the survivor of
the husband and wife, to pay over to such child or children or their issue,
and in such shares as the wife by deed or will should appoint, to be payable
to such child or children on attaining the age of twenty-one, or if a daughter,
marrying within that age with consent. The wife having died without
exercising the power, it was held that the property went to children and
grandchildren equally. The court, after reviewing the earlier authorities
and expressing its approval of the rule laid down in the Weehes' Scttle-
ment case, observed that if the learncd judge who decided that case had
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May it not be that the same sort of change of view point in
the construction of powers in trust is indicated by these cases,
as took place at a much earlier period in the construction of so-
called precatory trusts? It will be recalled that at one time very
slight language of desire or request on the part of a testator was
sufficient to impose a trust upon a devisee. In the same way
in the case of powers in trust, the courts once regarded the
power as imperative without much evidence of any such intent
on the part of the testator; but these recent English cases show
a departure from that viewpoint.
Among the American cases, we find two of the best reasoned
decisions laying down the rule that there is a presumption that
a special power to appoint to a class is imperative*0 In two
instances, where there was no appointment, courts have refused
to make a gift to the class under circumstances which would
indicate that they were not following such a presumption, though
there is not argument to that effect.5 ' Whether the American
courts would follow In re Combe and not apply any presumption
as to the imperative character of the power is believed to be,
to a large extent, an open question.
Having considered at length the remedy afforded when the
donee of a power in trust dies without executing it, we may ask
the question: Will equity do anything to compel the donee to
do his duty while he is yet alive? We are here, of course, con-
fronted with the difficulty which has already been referred to,
that though the power is imperative, the donee usually has a dis-
cretion as to the time he will exercise it, and equity will not
interfere with that discretion. Suppose, however, the donee is
to exercise the power within a given time or within a reasonable
time and that time has expired. Will equity order him to exer-
cise the power? In the case of the power of sale of an executor,
at least, it seems that this remedy would be available.2 There
are frequent statements to that effect, but very little authority
on the point. If equity would do so in the case of a power of
sale, there seems to be no good reason why it would not do so
in other cases of imperative powers, if a case arose where the
time had arrived when the donee was required by the terms of
before him the words here considered, he would have found that there was
a gift to the children by implication.
See also In re Hughes, supra note 36, a case involving a gift in trust
subject to a power, where the court quoted with approval the hard and fast
rule, as stated by Farwell, making an implication of a gift.
5o Dominick v. Sayre, supra note 4; Milhollen's Adm'r v. Rice, supra
note 4.
53 Morris v. Owen, 2 Call 520 (Va. 1801); Holt v. Hogan, 5 Jones Eq. 82
(N.C. 1859). See also Frazier v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 2 Leigh 642 (Va. 1831).
52 Teator v. Salander, 305 Ill. 17, 136 N.E. 873 (1922).
53 2 Dana 74 (Ky. 1834).
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the instrument to exercise the power. In M1udrow's Heirs V.
Fox's Heirs,Z3 it is clear that the court ordered the executor to
sell at the instance of the beneficiaries, though the action does
not directly involve a review of that order. In Pipcr v. Pipcr,
reference is made to an order in the, court below (unappealed
from and therefore not in issue in this action), directing the
executor to execute a power to determine the size of shares of
legatees within a given time. Under the facts of the case the
action of the court may be questioned, but the case shows the
tendency of courts to treat the duty of some holders of powers
as enforceable in equity.
In conclusion, then, we may say that the essential feature of
a power in trust is that the creator intended it to be imperative;
that equity will, in so far as it can, carry out this intention
of the donor; that equity will never exercise the power; but that
it provides such remedies as are possible under the circum-
stances; as Hawkins says, "the court ... carries out the inten-
tion of the testator cy pres"; * that a fair conclusion from the
cases is that equity will impose a constructive trust on the
property for the benefit of those for whose benefit the power was
made imperative; and that in a proper case it might order the
donee to make an appointment. Whether or not the power itself
is to be regarded as a trust res makes little difference, since it is
of such a unique character that many analogies from the law of
trusts would be inapplicable. The important thing is that the
donee of the power is under an active fiduciary duty of a charac-
ter different from any that may be imposed on donees of optional
powers.
Are there other legal consequences arising from the fact that
a power is intended to be imperative, in addition to those which
have already been outlined? In the main that is a question
which the decisions have so far not clearly answered. But it is
believed that on a question of the extinguishment of powers by
the act of the donee, the imperative character of the power is
controlling. That, however, will be considered in Part II of this
paper.
(To be continued)
Z4 3 My. & K. 159 (1834).
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